shows that tenancies at will had become more common after the famine, so that the distribution here may have been rather different in earlier periods.
leases. Table 1 summarizes the results of the first national statistical study of tenancy from 1870. Tenancy at will was most common in the northern and western provinces of Ulster and Connaught and on holdings valued at less than ?15, but tenancy at will and yearly tenancy accounted for the majority of farmers everywhere in Ireland.4 Table 1 also suggests an important point to which we return later: a substantial majority of the more extensive farms in Ireland were not tenancies at will.
A tenant at will had no legal guarantee of continuing occupation; his landlord could, in theory, eject him any year. This supposed insecurity lies at the heart of what J. Mokyr calls the "Land Tenure Hypothesis" of Irish poverty. Without leases landlords could always raise rents or eject a sitting tenant, giving tenants no incentive to invest in their holdings, as the landlord could appropriate the value of any investment the tenant might make.5 Nor did tenants have any incentive to protect their landlord's investments in the holding. Thus, the argument goes, neither party made the long-term investments necessary to increase agricultural productivity. As Raymond Crotty notes, this alleged inability to recover the value of improvements formed a central feature of the argument for tenant right, discussed below. 6 The idea of insecure tenancy informs much of the older historical research on Ireland. For example, K. H. Connell's account of demographic patterns prior to the Famine is based on the notion that peasants wanted to invest in people rather than land. Any evidence of increased prosperity, Connell claims, would be immediately soaked up by a landlord (or middleman) in the form of a rent increase. This behavior, if it actually occurred, seems unlikely to have been in the long-term interest of landlords, who would have benefited from a more cooperative solution. Nonetheless, according to Connell, "elastic rent" deterred even effort devoted to the current year's output; "If a man worked harder he was more likely to enrich his landlord than himself." 7 Tenancies at will notwithstanding, Irish farmers occupied their holdings for surprisingly long times. Long occupation without a lease often reflected the landlord's recognition of tenant right, or the "Ulster Custom." This practice has vexed Ireland's historians for generations, and there is no consensus on how or why it emerged. Although most common in Ulster, the institution was widespread throughout Ireland. Three central features of the Ulster Custom, sometimes referred to as the "three F's," were "fixity of tenure" or the right to remain on a holding so long as rent was paid; the right to pay a "fair" rent; and the right to "free sale" of the tenant's interest or tenant right when a tenancy changed hands. Fixity of tenure amounted to an informal, perpetual lease. Fair rent meant to Irish peasants a rent less than the "rack" rent: the rent at which a holding would let should the landlord solicit bids on an open market. Solow and W. E. Vaughan interpret the rack rent as the Ricardian rent.8 With rent below the Ricardian rent, the sitting tenant could find incoming tenants willing to pay a lump sum for the right to rent the land at the "fair rent"; this sum, or the practice of paying it, constituted much of tenant right.9 As contemporaries noted, tenant right implied an awkward coproprietorship in land. For tenant right to have any meaning, the landlord had to concede certain rights-such as setting rents at competitive levels-normally associated with the ownership of land.
Reform of Tenancy
Parliament regulated tenancy in several major steps. The Land Act of 1870 required compensation for improvements to all outgoing tenants as well as compensation for disturbance to any tenants who were ejected. In a more confusing set of clauses, the Act of 1870 also legalized the Ulster Custom where it had existed before. Legalization of the Ulster Custom had ambiguous implications, since the act never defined the Ulster Custom nor did the act prevent the rent increases that would reduce the value of the tenant's interest. In 1881 Parliament altered the basis of landlord-tenant relations more fundamentally. The 1881 act extended the three F's to all of Ireland and established a system to determine and en- force fair rents. Land courts had the authority to fix judicial rents for 15-year terms. Rent regulation in effect guaranteed the value of tenant right.10 The 1881 Fair Rent Act gave a statutory basis to what amounted to a coproprietorship in Irish agricultural land: landlords had the right to draw an income from land, but tenants had limited property rights in the same land. Table 2 shows the impact of the rent regulation on tenancy in Ireland up through 1919. The 1911 census of Ireland estimates the area of agricultural land in Ireland at nearly 19 million acres; by this estimate, about 60% of the agricultural land of Ireland was let at a rate fixed by a first judicial tenancy. First and second judicial terms implied rent reductions on the order of 20%, while the comparatively rare third judicial terms implied much smaller reductions. For a farmer paying ?20 annually in rent, a rent reduction of 20% implied an increase in tenant right of some ?130." The true impact of rent reduction on tenant-right values was at least somewhat less; with price declines in the 1880s and 1890s, Ricardian rents also fell.
Tenant Purchase
Tenant ownership of the land had been a demand of some Irish parties from the start, although only a few leaders (such as Michael Davitt) advocated outright nationalization. Several late nineteenth-century land acts concerned primarily with the regulation of tenancy had also included provisions aimed at encouraging landlords to sell tenants their holdings. These early provisions had relatively modest effects, as the terms on which land was to be sold were not terribly attractive to landlord or to tenant. Organized somewhat differently was the Congested Districts Board, which had been established in 1891 with the goal of creating holdings sufficient to support families in the poorest areas of the northwest and west of Ireland, and so engaged in considerable amalgamation and restructuring of holdings.12 The board acquired the power to compel landlords to sell their land in 1909 but, before that, had succeeded in acquiring and selling a large number of holdings.
The Wyndham Act of 1903 produced a large increase in the number of tenant purchases, not least because it established much better terms for tenants and gave hefty bonuses to landlords who sold their estates. Under this act landlords and tenants negotiated a sale price. Once the sale was arranged, the government paid the landlord in cash and advanced the tenant the cost of the land with repayment in the form of an annuity at 3.25% interest. Landlords received both a cash bonus on completion of the sale and the right to sell their own demesne to the state and purchase it back under the same terms as their tenants purchased farms. This second provision permitted many landlords to exchange costly mortgages for low cost state annuities.13 The immediate effect of this arrangement was salutary for most tenants: the purchase price was legally required to be such as to make the annuity payments between 10% and 30% below rents fixed in the second judicial term. The 1909 Birrell Act revised land purchase to contend with the initiative's unexpected popularity, replacing cash payments to landlords with stock paying 3%. This made land sale less popular as landlords were unreceptive toward the securities and tenants were required to pay a slightly higher interest rate. What Did Land Reform Accomplish? How did the measured efficiency of agriculture evolve following the Land Acts? In the absence of detailed microeconomic data from the pe-riod before land purchase became general, comparing the performance of owner-occupied farms with those that were still tenanted, no certain answer is possible. Nonetheless, given the generality of the reforms, if there were any important effects on agricultural efficiency one would expect a significant upward shift in the trend of aggregate productivity. There is no evidence of such a shift. Real agricultural output per acre was stagnant over the period in question: it increased by less than 7% from the 1870s to the 1910s.29 If insecurity of tenure had been the cause of low rates of investment before the reforms, then capital formation should have accelerated afterward. Instead, the capital stock grew more slowly in the 1890s than during the 1850s-1870s. However, labor input fell quite rapidly over the postreform period so that output per capita and total factor productivity rose sharply. In Great Britain there was no comparable rise in output per member of the agricultural workforce.30 But this rise was already well under way at the time of the land reforms, with the rate of increase in output per worker greater in 1851-81 than in 1881-1911.31 There is nothing in the aggregate evidence to suggest that the Land Acts had any positive effect on agricultural efficiency: if anything the data indicate a small negative effect.
The empirical evidence is consistent with our argument that the Irish Land Acts had little effect on the distribution of productive resources, and so at most minor effects on agricultural efficiency. Yet the land-reform program was certainly not insignificant: it redistributed wealth among landlords, tenants, and British taxpayers. The distinction between redistributing wealth and reallocating resources has caused some confusion in the Irish historiography. One historian, for example, claims that by reducing rents the 1881 act lowered the price of land relative to other inputs, thereby inducing farmers to shift from labor-intensive tillage to the more land-intensive grazing.32 John P. Huttman's analysis is flawed; a reduction in the rent paid to the landlord would be fully capitalized in the tenant right and so have no effect whatsoever on the opportunity cost of using land. Any new tenant would pay for the reduced rent paid to the landlord in the form of an increased tenant-right payment to the current tenant. Nor did the purchase acts improve resource allocation. The United Kingdom's taxpayers simply subsidized the transformation of the landlord's right to receive a rent into a terminable annuity.
Revisionist analysis of Ireland's land reforms has, then, correctly argued that these initiatives had little direct impact on incentives to work and to invest. According to this view, Parliament could have achieved the same ends by a program of nondistortionary taxes that made landlords poorer and their tenants wealthier. Yet the revisionists have failed to appreciate that changing the distribution of wealth by itself can have important economic effects. There are two channels through which changes in wealth brought about by a land reform might affect production.
Standard economic theory shows that a lump-sum increase in wealth will decrease labor supply so long as leisure is a normal good. Tenants whose rent is reduced (or whose rents are converted to the smaller purchase annuity payments) would be less inclined to take on additional work off their own farms, as had been the widespread practice. This effect may actually reduce agricultural output, though it will necessarily leave the farmer better off. The reduction in the labor supply of former tenants will increase the demand for farm labor from others, and so increase agricultural wages.33 Less likely, the increase in farmers' wealth may improve nutritional intake and thus the quality of farm labor. Tenant right also expanded the possibility of implicit loans from a landlord. We argue elsewhere that landlords tolerated tenant right because they had first claim against arrears on payment received by an outgoing tenant.42 Moreover, tenant right gave tenants better incentives to pay their rent as they knew that any arrears would eventually be deducted from the tenant right. Tenant right also made landlords less concerned about small arrears, and so more willing to extend small loans in the form of overdue rent.43 Tenant purchasers lost this implicit credit channel. W. F. Bailey, an official of the Land Commission, undertook a brief study of the conditions of tenants who had purchased holdings under the acts prior to 1903. He reports that "here and there a purchaser complained that he must pay on the moment, and had to sell cattle at an inconvenient period; that under the landlord system the tenants would have got time.""44 While it is true that the lower annuity payments would have reduced the need to go into arrears, it is difficult to believe that many purchasers did not regret at one time or another the passing of a landlord who would accept the rent a few months late.
Mortgage Credit and Land Purchase
Bailey identified lack of access to credit as one of the most important problems for tenant purchasers: "On a large number of estates we found that the purchasers are greatly hampered by the absence of working capital, and that they are frequently prevented from making desirable improvements from this cause."45 Bailey went on to worry that if some provision were not made to meet these needs, new purchasers would turn to informal credit sources such as usurers. Although we have little direct evidence concerning the uses to which loans were put, in testimony before the 1914 Departmental Committee one advocate of an agricultural bank wanted to provide loans for purchase of land, machinery, implements, seed, and fertilizer, among other purposes. 46 The Departmental Committee also found that loans from banks and other formal sources were expensive for Irish smallholders. 47 One way to improve credit facilities would have been to emulate the several continental countries that had established land banks to provide long-term financing to farmers on the security of their holdings. Most modemrn land reforms have included expansions of rural credit facilities with varying degrees of success. To the contrary, the Land Purchase Acts contained clauses that restricted the ability of former tenants to obtain credit on the security of land they now owned. The 1903 act limited mortgage debt to 10 times the annual Land Commission payment on any holding bought with state aid.48 While the statute is somewhat unclear as to whether debt to the state is to be considered within the limit, it is evident from the Departmental Committee report of 1914 that it applies only to second mortgages.49 For some tenant purchasers this limit reduced the availability of credit. Before land purchase the tenant effectively owned a fairly large portion of the land's value via tenant right and was able to raise loans on this portion of the land without legal restriction. After purchase, the farmer could borrow only 10 times the annual annuity payment, or approximately one-third of the purchase price. But this was the purchase price of the remaining value of the land, the part not already owned by the farmer through tenant right. This meant that so long as the value of tenant right was greater than one-third of the land purchase price, the farmer could borrow less money after purchasing his holding than he could before. That is, tenant right had established a coproprietorship in land, and before purchase tenants could borrow on the security of the part of the land they owned. The rules of tenant purchase, however, forbad them to take full advantage of these older property rights.
Consider the hypothetical example, presented in table 3, of a farm that would rent for ?10 in an unregulated market. If the farm was under a second-term judicial rent, and if both the first and second terms reduced the rent by 21%, then the rent paid in 1900 would be ?6.40. The value of the tenant right would be about ?111, assuming 3.25% interest and that the Ricardian rent would still be ?10. As we have seen, the tenant could borrow against some, perhaps all, of the ?111 in tenant-right value. If the tenant purchased the holding from the landlord at 20 times the annual rent, paying ?128, fully financed by an advance from the Land Commission, his annuity payments would be about ?4.7 so that the maximum he could borrow would be ?47. The larger the proportion of the farm's total value that the occupier owned before purchase-that is, the larger his tenant right relative to the rent he paid the landlord-the more severe this restriction on mortgaging. The unusual institutional feature of tenant right, and the ability to borrow against it, meant that mortgage restriction that might have been neutral under a more standard tenure arrangement could actually reduce the availability of rural credit.
The mortgaging restriction was not absolute. A tenant purchaser could apply to the Land Commission for permission to exceed the debt limit. Few did so, however, and of those who did between 1904 and 1913 about 20% were refused and many that were granted permission were allowed to mortgage less than the amount requested.50 While the low number of applications might seem to indicate that the restriction on mortgaging was not binding, the Departmental Committee states that the constraint on borrowing was binding and that indeed it should be, otherwise there would be "overmortgaging.''"51 More likely purchasers, when faced with the choice of an application to the Land Commission or raising funds in some other fashion, chose to deal with a bank or some other nonmortgage lender. A later legal decision also provided a loophole by deciding that so-called judgment mortgages were outside the purview of the 1903 act. In the case of a judgment mortgage, if an unsatisfied creditor could show that his debtor owned an interest in land, the creditor could petition a court to give him, effectively, ownership of that land subject to satisfaction of the debt.52
The question is, Why did the government adopt a policy intended to restrict access to capital? In part, it was the action of a paternalistic government that simply did not trust peasant proprietors not to overburden their holdings with debt, leading either to their own ruin or to the ruin of their heirs. Two objections to this argument received little attention. First, the reasonable conclusion to draw from the evidence presented to the Departmental Committee or the Royal Commission on Congestion in Ireland would be that those seeking credit would find it one way or another. The real choice, from the government's viewpoint, was between a peasantry with debts secured on land and a peasantry with debts secured in some other way. Since nonmortgage debts were, by all accounts, likely to be more expensive, one would think the mortgage debts would be preferable. A second objection is more obvious: Why should the government care more about excess indebtedness among peasants than among any other social class?
Another motive for the mortgage restrictions was perhaps more transparent: the government wanted to maintain the seniority of its claims on purchasers. Bailey admits as much in rationalizing continued state supervision of land purchasers: "For its own security so long as the purchasers are liable for the repayment of their State annuities, the Government is bound to see that nothing is done that will endanger that security. . . . If land purchase is to be largely extended it is advisable that further conditions be provided that will limit the power of charging and mortgaging holdings in a manner that is injurious to the occupier and to the general community."53 In other words, if mortgaging endangers the purchaser's ability to repay the state, then the state should prevent the practice. Nowhere does Bailey consider the possible economic benefits of mortgaging.54 In the event, very few tenant purchasers defaulted prior to the partition of Ireland. In its report for 1920, the Land Commission noted that only 0.23% of purchasers (owing 0.23% of payments) were in arrears that year.55
Problems with Title to Land
The Departmental Committee argued that another obstacle to securing debts on Irish land was a poor system of title registration. The committee claimed that Continental smallholders were better-served by mortgage credit because of more effective title-registration systems, although no such system was in place in England.56 This comment highlights a second missed opportunity; rural credit facilities would have been greatly aided by a method of registering both titles and mortgages that enabled potential borrowers to establish clearly and with little cost what prior claims existed on a given holding. Ireland had no system of compulsory title registration, although purchasers receiving government assistance were required to register their new property. Even registry of title in Ireland was problematic, since it required the discharge of "equities," claims by emigrant relatives and others with a potential interest in the land.57"' An individual who contemplated making a mortgage loan had first to make sure that the borrower had clear title to the land and, then, had to establish what prior liens had been placed on the holding. The latter was virtually impossible if the borrower sought to conceal prior loans; registration of mortgage obligations was possible but not required (except for mortgages on land purchased with state aid under the 1903 act), and the method of registration required costly searches through many volumes. Much more efficient models were already in place in continental Europe. Bavaria presents a typical case; there, each locale kept one set of records recording property rights in land (the Grundbuch or Kataster), and another recording mortgages and other encumbrances such as family charges (the Hypothekenbiicher). Both were up-to-date public documents, based on contracts deposited in public archives, and each was organized by holding. To establish prior claims on a holding, a potential lender had only to inspect these documents. Complaints about the availability of rural credit were common in Bavaria at the end of the nineteenth century, but it is also clear that individuals were able to raise mortgages on very small properties-in some cases consisting of little more than a garden plot. The problem did not disappear with partition; the 1926 Banking Commission, which took a generally critical attitude toward bankers, blamed the lack of mortgage facilities on the people: "It will never be possible for any country or its inhabitants to borrow freely, unless there be full recognition of the justice of the debt so incurred, and full readiness to have the creditor take possession of the property and convert it to his own use..,. in the event that the debtor finds himself unwilling or unable to meet the terms of his agreement."63 The banks' unwillingness to extend mortgage credit robbed Irish tenant purchasers of one of the major benefits of ownership, the ability to use land as collateral for loans. Yet here the culprit was not Parliament, which could not legislate rural attitudes; the problem lay in the banks' perceptions of what would happen should they have to sell out a failed borrower. To the extent that these perceptions were accurate-and a profit-making bank had no reason to abstain from a particular line of business without good reasonthen rural norms formed one important limit to the ability of land reform to improve agricultural efficiency in Ireland.
Mortgage Credit and the Commoditization of Land
Another possible benefit to be had from the redefinition of property rights in land may come from making land more like any other commodity-relatively simple to purchase and to sell. If land can easily be traded in open markets, then the usual market mechanism ensures that land is allocated to its highest-value use. Ireland's land reform had mixed implications for the commoditization of land. Critics of the prereform tenancy system often complained, bitterly, that landlords would make tenants compete for the right to rent farms, thus increasing rents. To the extent this practice was general-and more recent research shows that it was not-tenants were simply complaining that such competition raised rents by allocating land to its highest-value use. 64 We will now consider how tenant right, whether in its customary form or in the form established by the 1870 and 1881 Land Acts, altered the ability to buy and to sell land. Legally it did not do so at all; there were no provisions against selling a holding that had a judicial rent fixed, and the rent remained with the holding, so a new tenant could be guaranteed of the judicial rent. The reform of tenancy might have actually improved the land market because it removed all uncertainty about compensation for improvements and the future course of rents. Previously, a purchaser would have to satisfy himself as to the landlord's practices and intentions before purchasing a holding. With regulation, however, individual landlord practices became nearly superfluous.
Crotty has argued that the tenant purchase program was a step backward in this respect, in that "it substantially destroyed the competitive market for land."65 He credits the land purchase acts with saddling Ireland with a large number of small, uneconomic holdings. Crotty claims that once a reduced annuity payment had replaced rent payments, Irish farmers became less sensitive to the true cost of owning and using their land; "as an owner-occupier, a farmer need not worry lest another man, by his willingness to invest more capital at a lower rate of return, might be able to pay a higher rent and cause his own eviction."'66 This posits either a remarkable degree of irrationality on the part of the new owners or simply a preference for land ownership. An owner-occupier could sell his land at a profit to anyone who believed that he could more efficiently farm it. If the owner chose not to do so because of a strong desire to hold land then this would indeed cause production to be lower than otherwise. But it would not affect economic efficiency per se since the owner would gain utility from simply owning the land: land would remain in the hands of those to whom it had the most value.
While the acts had little direct impact on the commoditization of land, their indirect effects through the limitation of mortgage credit may have created important obstacles to the consolidation of holdings. The acts' direct effect on the pattern of landholding was close to neutral. While the acts contained provisions that limited subdivision and subletting, no serious attempt forcibly to amalgamate small holdings was made in the reforms, apart from the somewhat limited efforts of the Congested Districts Board. But the limitations on mortgaging discussed above created major difficulties in raising sufficient money to purchase holdings. As was reported to the Departmental Committee, the purchase of holdings that had been obtained through tenant purchase was made significantly more difficult through the limitations on mortgaging. 
